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SUMiVIT ON I1PROVING JUDICIAL
SELECTION
NTRODUCTION: PERSOIAL VIEWS
Roy A. Schotland
Sergeant Friday's approach--"Just the facts"--is an important
step toward meeting our problems. A strildng achievement of the
Summit is its unprecedented assembly of information about judicial
elections. This step alone will, we hope, begin the regularized collection of the most needed data about judicial elections; e.g., how
many judges initially enter service by appointment, how many judicial elections are contested, campaign finance data, etc.
I believe that we need to clear away two myths that cloud the
scene. The two myths compete: One is the "denial myth," trying to
deny how hugely election systems dominate our selection of state
judges. This myth competes against the "distortion myth," which
tries to paint the candidates in these elections as panderers who care
more about campaign contributions than about justice or integrity.
The denial myth frequently surfaces in media coverage of judicial elections. Following are two recent examples: In September
2000, USA Today gave half of its editorial page to a debate over
whether "Campaign Contributions Corrupt Judicial Races."' The
debate's context was a list of the "21 States [that] elect their judges
and state Supreme Court justices." 2 It wasn't USA Today's fault, but
the fault of their myth-making source, that the list didn't include the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This paper was
prepared specifically for the Summit on Improving Judicial Selection. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the National Center for State Courts, the Joyce
Foundation, or the Open Society Institute.
1. Campaign ContributionsCorruptJudicialRaces, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,
2000, at 16A.
2. Id.
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little states of California, Florida, Indiana, or fifteen others. Or in
October 2000 the Washington Post, in a major article about conduct
in judicial campaigns, reported that eight states have partisan supreme court elections-because that same myth-making source is in
denial that there aren't a mere eight, but eleven states with partisan
supreme court elections-including the little states of Michigan and
Ohio, and another six with partisan elections for lower courts.
The denial myth aims at making us feel better about judicial
elections by pretending that there isn't that much to them. The competing distortion myth aims at making us feel worse about judicial
elections-much worse-by pretending that a great many of the
people who run for the bench and who cannot avoid the unsavory
work of raising campaign funds, are involved in what is damned as
"Payola Justice" or "Justice for Sale," to use two of the titles of socalled "studies" attacking entire supreme courts. 4 Of all such studies,
3. See George Lardner, Jr., Speech Rights and Ethics Disputed in Judicial
Races, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at A13.
4. Ohio Supreme Court Justice For Sale, N.E. OHIO AM. FRIENDS SERV.

COMM., at http://www.afsc.net/l_b_5.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001). See

also, T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 15, 2000, at IA (pointing to the correlation between favorable rulings and contributions to justices' political campaigns); Payola Justice: How Texas Supreme Court Justices Raise Money from Court Litigants,
TExANS FOR PUB. JUSTICE, at http://www.tpj.org/reports/payola/intro.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2001) (discussing the links between campaign contributors and the upcoming docket of the Texas Supreme Court).
The leading myth is probably about the California voters' 1986 denial
of retention to Chief Justice Rose Bird and the two fine justices that she took
down with her, Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. That election set the record
for spending in a judicial election, $11.5 million-or in 1999 dollars, $17.5
million. See Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1995, 2002 (1988). Of that sum, $6,001,708 was spent by
committees opposed to retention, and $3,195,336 was spent by the justices and
independent committees supporting them. See 7/1/86-12/31/86 CAMPAIGN
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITUREs, PART 2: SUPREME COuRT JUSTICES, CAL.
FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM'N. (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN
RECEIPTS].

The myth is that "[t]he media campaign against the justices received
heavy contributions from big business interests that were angry with the
court's decisions protecting consumers', tenants' and employees' rights.
The supporters of the incumbent justices, on the other hand, had less
resources .... ." Erwin Chemerinsky, EvaluatingJudicial Candidates, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1985, 1986 (1988). "The majority of these funds [in opposition
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to the justices] came from small contributions from individuals, but agricultural and business interests contributed a large proportion, with one contribution in the amount of $100,000." Judge Robert S. Thompson, JudicialRetention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California
Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2038 (1988). See also
Scott D. Weiner, Note, PopularJustice: State JudicialElections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 195 n.63 (1996) (mentioning the agricultural interest in the election due to "Chief Justice Bird's role
as Secretary of Agriculture").
In fact, seventy-seven percent of the opposition's $6,001,708 came
from contributions of less than $250; of their larger contributions, twenty-five
were over $10,000, fourteen of which were from individuals including: Clint
Eastwood ($30,000); and attorney Richard Riordan (who later became Mayor
of Los Angeles), who was responsible for the largest contribution in the entire
$11.4 million: $116,001. See CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS supra. No state in the
union matches California's FPPC for effective disclosure reports.
In contrast to California's undeniable flood of grassroots opposition to
the justices, only thirty-two percent of the contributions to the justices and the
independent committees supporting them, were small contributions. They did
enjoy thirty-one over-S10,000 contributions, eleven of which came from lawyers, law firms, or legal PACs. See id.
The myth about the money in the Rose Bird election is both distortion
and denial: distortion to the extent that it blames corporations and the wealthy
when seventy-seven percent of the funds came from the grassroots; and denial
that there could be genuine, strong, and widespread outrage at a justice who
put herself above the law. See generally Linde, supra, at 2002 (arguing that
the California judicial campaign was both "exceptional" and "disturbing").
May I add that I would have voted for Rose Bird, but before the election, I would have done all that I could to get her to resign. No one, I believe,
has ever done as much damage to judicial independence in America as she did.
Whatever one's view of the Rose Bird debacle, Tennessee's 1996 denial of retention for Justice Penny White was unfair. The attack on White involved her vote in only one case, not an unyielding course of conduct. See
State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). That case involved a death sentence in which White had joined a strong majority of her court. See id. The
Governor, Don Sundquist, and others who sought to defeat White in order to
secure a vacancy on the court, exploited her vote in that one capital case as a
weapon, and succeeded with a low-cost (of only about $25,000) campaign of
direct mail and mass faxing. See Stephen B. Bright, Is FairnessIrrelevant?
The Evisceration ofFederalHabeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability
of State Courts to Protect FundamentalRights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1,
11-13 (1997). Sundquist and the others who misled Tennessee's voters damaged judicial independence. After Justice White was removed, Sundquist
stated, "should a judge look over his shoulder about whether they're going to
be thrown out of office? I hope so." Pamela Wade, White's Defeat Poses Legal Dilemma; How is a Replacement Justice Picked?, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 3, 1996, at Al.
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I know of only one that has the integrity to note that just because a
justice received a contribution from a lawyer or a party and later
voted on a case involving that lawyer 5or party-to use the scholarly
words--"correlation is not causation."

Let me give one example of the distortion myth, the "Justice for
Sale" attack on the Ohio Supreme Court by the American Friends
Service Committee of Northern Ohio. 6 Brought out early this year
and winning significant local press coverage-but not a mite of
analysis-this "study" took the moral high road to report what it
called the "compliance ratings" of the Ohio justices: that is, how
often that each justice voted for the lawyers who had contributed to
that justice's campaigns; for example, Chief Justice Tom Moyer had
a "compliance [with donors who are law firms] rating" of 74.8%. 7
The media coverage seemed to assume that such an analysis from
such a source, about people who are so low as to engage in campaign
fundraising, must be sound.
But consider just two facts about that study, and you decide
whether you agree with me that the attackers lack integrity far more
clearly than do their targets: First, for example, the study's method
gives Moyer a fifty percent compliance rating if, say, he got a fifty
dollar contribution from one lawyer and voted for that lawyer's side
in a case, while at the same time voting against the other side which
was represented by a lawyer who had given him $5000-after all,
Moyer had voted for a contributor half of the time. Is this honest
muckraking or mudslinging? Just one other fact about that study
needs mentioning: The most frequent contributor on the study's list
of contributing law firms was "AttyGen"--apparently (though not
explicitly, and my efforts for clarification were unsuccessful), this
5. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and JudicialDecisions: A Case Study

ofArbitrationLaw in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2001). The most
thorough study "docket-linked contributions" came out in May 2001, on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court over 10 years and 481 cases; it "did not show any
link between campaign contributions and the court's decision." The study was
done by the National Institute for Money in State Politics, for Wisconsin Citizen Action. See Personal Wealth Fueled Campaigns, Study Says; Lawyers
Acount for Second-Largest Source of Funds to Justices' Races, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL-SENTnNEL, May 16, 2001, at 2B.
6. N.E. OHIO AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supranote 4, at tbl.B.
7. Id.
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"firm" consists of the members of the office of Ohio's elective attorney general who, unsurprisingly, made some contributions to justices. Since the AttyGen firm participated in about one-third of that
court's cases, and since, inevitably, the justices often voted for the
side represented by AttyGen, that sharply boosted their compliance
ratings. Such an attack on judges is not mere distortion, it is contemptible.
The people of thirty-nine states have chosen to have their judges
face the voters. Of the nation's total 1243 state appellate judges, for
initial terms, 47% are appointed, 40% face partisan elections, and
13% face nonpartisan elections! Of our 8489 state trial judges (general jurisdiction), for initial terms, 24% are appointed, 43% face partisan elections, and 33% face nonpartisan elections. 9 For subsequent
terms, if one includes retention elections, 87% of our state appellate
and trial court judges face elections. 10
If judges and judicial candidates face elections, they will often
need to raise campaign funds, and in that way and other ways, they
are forced to try to reach the voters. The denial myth and the distortion myth converge in where they come out: Since nothing can be
done about judicial elections, we must eliminate them or at least
eliminate competitive elections.
We will meet at the Summit to bring out the realities, to dispel
myths that undermine confidence in our state courts and to find steps
that will bolster public confidence in those courts. Some possible
steps would need official action, such as assuring that judges will
withdraw from cases in which counsel or a party has made an excessive contribution-i.e., an amount above what that jurisdiction believes is an appropriate sum; or such as assuring that judges will not
retain surplus campaign funds as war chests for future campaigns."

8. All statistics are derived from the survey in U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, avail-

able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjspub/pdf/sco9802.pdf. (last visited Feb.
23, 2001) [hereinafter BUREAU].
9. See id. For subsequent terms: 11% of appellate judges are appointed
and 43% face retention elections, 32% face partisan and 13% face nonpartisan
elections; of trial judges, 12% are appointed, 25% face retention elections,
28% face partisan and 35% face nonpartisan elections. See id.
10. See id.
11. See generally REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND WORKING
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In almost every state, many steps forward can be taken by rules
promulgated by the supreme court.12 Some possible steps would call
for legislative or constitutional action, such as when one wanted to
change the length ofjudges' terms.
It is crucially important to note at the outset that some steps call
for nonofficial action by members of the bar and citizens who share
our concern to assure a juster justice. For example, if inappropriate
conduct in judicial campaigns is to be controlled, it is clear that official action faces major hurdles from the First Amendment and due
process guarantees. Whatever official action can do to protect judicial independence from campaigns that make judges seem like
merely more elected officials, it is clear that groups of distinguished
and diverse citizens can serve invaluably to promote appropriate
campaigning in judicial elections.
Judicial elections exist to assure accountability in our pluralist
democracy by putting the choice to the voters. No one can be surprised that democracy is not problem-free. Nor is it any surprise that
among the best answers to such problems are more active pluralism
and more informed democracy.
Perhaps some people would like to give some of our time in
Chicago to comparing judicial elections with other selection systems.
Certainly everyone cares about that, but I hope you share my view of
it: First, it is hard to imagine saying anything new on that subject.
No subject in American law has gotten as much ink, and as much
sweat, over so many years. Second, unlike the heavily plowed arguments about judicial selection systems, judicial election problems
have received remarkably little attention, although they have become
disturbingly acute.
The third and last reason: this is where the action is. And the
"action" has so many aspects that, as one chief justice said, our
Summit agenda puts five days' topics into two days. The judicial
selection controversy is less lively. For almost a century-starting in
1906 with a landmark speech to the ABA by Roscoe Pound-the
GROUP ON CAMPAIGN FIN. LrrlG., BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE

(1998) (discussing
the need for a strategic effort directed at campaign finance reform).
12. See, e.g., In the Matter of Maney, 510 N.E.2d 312, 313 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that political activity by judges in New York is governed by the Rules
Governing Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics).
JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
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Bar, and so much more than the Bar, has given enormous energy to
getting rid of competitive elections.' 3 Back in 1900, roughly 14% of
our judges did not face competitive elections.' 4 Today, after that
century of major effort, we boosted that 14% to 23% of our trial5
judges of general jurisdiction and 47% of our appellate judges.'
That's a shift of 1% per decade for the trial judges, and 3-4% per

decade for appellate judges. At that rate we'll end contestable elections for trial judges in only another 770 years, and for appellate
judges in only another 160 years.' 6 That great Chief Justice Arthur

T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey said that "judicial reform is no sport for
the short-winded,"' 17 but I hope you won't think me shortsighted in
urging that we focus on, say, the next few decades.
I hope we are all committed to doing all we can, as soon as we
can, to assure that judicial elections bring an appropriate balance

between judicial accountability and judicial independence.

13. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the AdministrationofJustice,29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
14. See BUREAU, supranote 8.
15. See id.
16. The above was written before last year's election. Florida's dramatic
election events have overshadowed a major development in judicial reform:
Florida voters defeated a ballot proposition that would have replaced, for their
trial judges, nonpartisan contestable elections and instead put those judges into
the same system as Florida's appellate judges: merit appointment and retention elections. See Howard Troxler Merit Based Judge Selection Didn't Fly
with Voters, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2000, available at
wysiwyg//http://www.sptimes.om/news.pf/TampaBay/Merit-basedjudge_s
el.shtml.
In 1998, Florida voters strongly supported a statewide ballot proposition
to have each judicial circuit and county vote separately in 2000 on another
ballot proposition. Between 1998 and last year's election, the legislature made
the wording of the proposition for this year's ballots less favorable to the proposed change. See id.
This year, the change was voted down in every one of the twenty circuits and sixty-seven counties; the affirmative vote on the change for circuit
judges averaged 32%, and for county judges (sixty-seven counties) 26%. See
id.
17. Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Federalism, 45 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 705 n.629 (1995) (citing MInIUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION xix (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949)).
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